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Collins: Jones v. Wittenberg

RECENT CASE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHTS
OF STATE PRISONERS-FEDERAL
COURT INTERVENTION IN STATE
PRISON ADMINISTRATION
Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
N Jones v. Wittenberg,' District Court Judge Don J. Young found that

the constitutional rights of the prisoners of Lucas County Jail in
Toledo, Ohio, were being infringed; that the conditions existing there
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution. Also, detention, as a matter
of routine for those awaiting trial, under the same conditions, was held to
be violative of due process. Later, in Jones v. Wittenberg,2 problems of
implementation were solved by a sweeping grant of specific forms of relief.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit is confronted with the question of
how far the trend of federal court intervention into state prison
administration is to extend.
The plaintiff prisoners brought a class action for themselves and
those who are presently or may be confined in the Lucas County Jail.
They sought injunctive and declaratory relief under section 1983 of
3
the Civil Rights Act.
Experts testified for plaintiffs that this jail was uncommonly bad in
every aspect. With the exception of murderers and women, there was
no attempt to separate the young from the old nor those convicted from
those held in pretrial detention (the latter comprising about three-quarters
of the total number of inmates). At times only one or two guards were
available for the entire three floors of cells. Overcrowding caused many
prisoners to sleep on the floor. Leaking and ill-functioning plumbing
contributed to deplorable sanitary conditions. There was no infirmary and
health care was difficult to obtain. Food was served in an unsanitary
manner and was inadequate in quality and quantity. Discipline was
enforced by confinement in strip cells which were unheated and located
below ground level. Imposition of discipline occurred without notice,
hearing, or right to counsel. There were no social services, exercise,
recreation, reading, or rehabilitation programs. The opinion noted that
grand juries had often condemned these conditions.
The court held that (1) it had jurisdiction,

(2) this was an

1323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
2 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
3 42 U.S.C. J 1983 (1970).
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inappropriate case for application of the abstention doctrine because
of chilling effects on vital issues of civil rights, (3) the class action
was proper since the claim of any one particular individual could
become moot at any time, and (4) the conditions violated plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and they were entitled to relief.
After hearings confined to remedies, the court issued an extraordinary
order in which it granted plaintiffs' specific relief. The defendants were
first given ninety days to bring the jail population down to no more than
two inmates per cell. A plan to provide every habitable room in the jail
with one ceiling light fixture was to be submitted within thirty days and
implemented within ninety days. Within thirty days, at least two guards
were to be on duty on each floor at all times and one of them was to
patrol the cell blocks. As a condition of employment or continued
employment, every guard was to be required to pass the course provided
by the United States Bureau of Prisons. The defendants had ninety days to
present a comprehensive plan for upgrading jail personnel. Food services
were to be brought within nutritional and public health guidelines given
by the court. Within thirty days defendants were to submit a plan which
would include classification and diagnosis of prisoners at intake, a work
or study release program, group and individual counselling, education,
religious programs, recreation, constructive occupation during confinement, and improved visitation privileges. Every prisoner was to be
furnished material for personal hygiene and was to be required to clean
his own area. A full-time physician was to be present in the jail and
part-time help for him was to be obtained. Within thirty days a plan
to provide space for medical examination, treatment, and convalescence
was to be submitted and implemented within one hundred twenty days.
Proposals for communication privileges for those awaiting trial were to be
offered within thirty days and no unreasonable censorship of the other
prisoners' mail was to occur. Non-censored reading material was to be
freely furnished. The only exceptions were to be those publications
clearly within the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity. No solitary
confinement was to be permitted, although isolation within proper limits
could be used. Discipline was to be enforced solely by loss of privileges.
Defendants were required to submit a plan for certain basic repairs and
alterations including interior paint, provision of drinking fountains,
and repair of toilets and of the cell-locking system. The court retained
jurisdiction until such time it was satisfied that the reforms had become
permanent. Since there was no showing of actual malice, Judge Young
refused to grant damages against the defendants.4

The order has been summarized in considerable detail to illustrate its sweeping and
specific nature.
4
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Thus, the decision went beyond Holt v. Sarver,5 hitherto the
pioneering decision in the area of federal court intervention into state
prison administration. In Holt, after laying down broad guidelines for the
correction of a few abuses and requiring a "prompt and reasonable start,"
to be prosecuted "with all reasonable diligence to completion as soon as
possible," 6 the court said, "subsidiary problems will take care of
at this time.... The
themselves. It would be a mistake to order too much
7
Court will not be dogmatic about time just now."
The path to federal court intervention into state prison administration
has been a tortuous and rocky one.
The first obstacle has been the status of the prisoner himself. If he is
to be considered similar to a slave, having forfeited his privileges by
his offense against society, he has no rights. There are thus no problems
of enforcement of his rights. This view, not altogether an unpopular
one, long prevailed at law, but its moral posture has gradually lost
favor. After all, since about ninety-five per cent of the prisoners return
to society at one time or another, practice of rights and obligations during
8
confinement should make for more continuity and less alienation. Today
it is generally accepted that the prisoner retains all rights except those
necessarily removed by reason of his confinement.9
After this hurdle was passed, the courts raised others. Among
them were the lack of jurisdiction, 10 the inapplicability to the states
of the particular constitutional right asserted through the fourteenth
amendment, u and the necessity of exhausting state remedies before
applying for federal relief.' 2 These reasons, showing an understandable

5 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
6 Id. at 383.
71d. at 385.
S Singer, Censorship of Prisoner'sMail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051 (1970).

9 Compare Ruffm v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871) ("He is for the
time being the slave of the State.... [Hlis estate is administered like that of a dead
man"), with Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 325 U.S.
887 (1945), and Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948) (One of the rights which
may be properly regulated is that of arguing one's own case in a habeas corpus
proceeding).
10E.g., Siegal v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950)
(activities of a jailhouse lawyer).
31 E.g., in the area of cruel and unusual punishment, see Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323 (1892), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), Pervear v. Massachusetts,
72 U.S. (5 Wall) 475 (1866). Contra, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
12 For what would seem to be a final rest for this objection, see Wilwording v.
Swenson, 92 S. Ct. 407 (1971), noted in 10 CRIM. L. REP. 4095 (Dec. 15, 1971).
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reluctance to interfere with state administrative policies seemed to harden
what has been coined as a "hands-off" approach.' 3
Little by little, these objections were overcome. The wedge was the
freedom of religion cases where courts could grasp some precedent. 14
Other constitutional rights soon provided vehicles for intervention. Among
these were the right to legal assistance (including jailhouse lawyers), 5
freedom of expression (including freedom from mail censorship),' 6 and
17
due process access to the courts.
Several factors facilitated this trend toward intervention. One was
the emergence of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act as a remedy rather
than habeas corpus, mandamus, and tort claims.'8 Judicial activism in
other battlegrounds such as reapportionment and school desegregation
had provided models. Judges were becoming painfully aware of the abuses
in the correctional system, many of them having for the first time visited
the institutions to which they had been sentencing convicts. The protest
movements were arriving in the courts, and institutions like schools
defended on much the same basis-the special need to enforce internal
discipline and the court's lack of expertise in the area.' 9
But the defeat of the old objections did not herald in an era without
restrictions. The modem obstacles seem to be a requirement of showing
exceptional circumstances when indeed intolerable conditions are the rule
rather than the exception. 20 Also, a remnant of the "hands-off" policy, the
"rule of reason" recognizes the prisons' right and duty to
enforce
reasonable disciplinary regulations.21 So, balancing necessarily comes into
play. Is the regulation reasonable? Does a compelling state interest
override the right involved in the least drastic manner? Should balancing
be employed at all in the area of constitutional rights? Must there be
13 Gallington, Prison Disciplinary Decisions,60 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 152 (1969); Note,

Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 178 (1967);
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
14Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206
F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).

15 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
16 Compare Palmiginao v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970) with Diehl
v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1970) (claim of freedom to take Bible
correspondence course held frivolous) and Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied 342 U.S. 829 (1951) (courts are limited to releasing illegally confined
prisoners, not their superintendence).
17See Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964).
1S Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Note, Priesoners"Rights under 1 1983, 57
GEo. L.J. 1270 (1969); 42 U.S.C. 1 1983: An Emerging Vehicle of Post-Conviction
Relief for State Prisoners,22 U. FLA. L. REv. 596 (1970).
19 Singer, supra note 8.
20 E.g., Wright v. McCann, 257 F. Supp. 737, 747 N.D.N.Y. (1966).
21 In re Ferguson, 55 Cal.2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 864 (1961); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (1957).
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a showing of a clear and present danger to prison discipline in order
to justify the restriction? 22 Should the courts take into account whether
the prison is performing a valid penal function? 25 What constitutes
a rehabilitative program?
As late as 1971, the Second Circuit said:
We do not doubt the magnitude of the task ahead before our
correctional systems become acceptable and effective from
a correctional, social, and humane viewpoint, but the proper tools
for the job do not lie with a remote federal court. The sensitivity
to local nuance, opportunity for daily perseverance, and the human
and monetary resources required lie rather with legislators,
24
executives, and citizens in their communities.
By far the most important constitutional vehicle for intervention is
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
At first the clause was of limited value since it was considered to apply
only to those practices common in English in the period prior to the
Revolution such as quartering, disfigurement, and disembowelment. In
Weems v. United States,25 the court took a more expansive view of the
clause since the motive for it was to prevent coercive cruelty of whatever
kind imposed by government. The intimation was that punishment
disproportionate to the crime it punished would be suspect. That decision
gives an indication of how the courts have grappled with the meaning
of the vague phrase in attempting to define the extent of its content. 26
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision in broad construction of the
phrase was Trop v. Dulles't where Chief Justice Warren, pointing out that
the punishment of denationalization was not disproportionate to the
crime of wartime desertion, found that it was nevertheless a punishment
within the meaning of the amendment. The Second Circuit has developed
a three-pronged test consisting of historical usage, practices in other
jurisdictions, and public opinion.28 The last would seem to be the only
standard of much use to prisoners.
22 Compare Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968)

with Abernathy v.
Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968).
23 Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Glenn v. Wilkinson, 309 F.
Supp. 411 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (death row segregation is valid); Singer, Prison Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation, 20 CAnT U.L. Rv. 365
(1971).
24 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971).
25217 U.S. 349 (1910).
26 Certain acts have been held as not constituting cruel and unusual punishment. See
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (punishment for drunkenness); Rudolph v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (capital punishment); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (a second attempt after a foiled electrocution).
But see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (punishment for drug addiction
held to be cruel and unusual punishment).
2356 U.S. 86 (1958).
2
8 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971).
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The Arkansas prison system provided fertile ground for litigation in
this area since it was one of the last states to abandon corporal punishment
for disciplinary infractions. 29 This series of cases culminated in Holt v.
Sarver,30 in which the totality of circumstances existing in Arkansas
prisons was found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Holt
3
produced a flurry of generally favorable comments in the law reviews. '
The court in Holt said, "[i]f Arkansas is going to operate a Penitentiary
System, it is going to have to be 32a system that is countenanced by the
Constitution of the United States.
Jones v. Wittenberg uses the same totality of circumstances test to
find the existence of cruel and unusual punishment. This raises problems
in allowing correctional officials (and indeed plaintiffs) to know which
factors are critical and to what extent they are critical. How much
needs to be corrected before circumstances no longer constitute cruel
and unusual punishment?
Another question the principal case raises is the proper role of the
courts. There is nearly universal accord that somebody should do
something about our prisons. Should it be the courts? Perhaps there is an
analogy here to an activist court moving where dilatory tactics have left
33
it no other recourse as in school desegregation. But will court action
inhibit the executive and legislative branches from action in prison
reform? Is a court sufficiently expert to solve perplexing problems which
require special expertise that the other branches can provide?
No doubt it will be argued that judges are not penologists and should
not meddle in prison administration. However neither are judges
economists, transportation experts, or electrical engineers; and yet
they regularly review decisions of the Federal Trade Commission,34
Interstate Commerce Commission, and Federal Power Commission.
In Morris v. Travisane3 5 the court assumed the rather unique position
of mediator between the authorities and the prisoners, at times soliciting
prisoner opinion on proposed reforms. This role permits a court to

29Courtney

v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F.

Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.);
Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
30 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
3123 ALA. L. REv. 143 (1970); 24 ARK. L. REv. 477 (1971); 20

DRAKE

L. REv. 188

(1970); 16 N.Y.L.F. 659 (1970); 3 SETON L. REv. 159 (1971); 48 TEx. L. REV.
1198 (1970).
32 309 F. Supp. at 385
33 See Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971): "[Once
a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable
powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies."
34

Symposium: Prisoners' Rights and the CorrectionalScheme: The Legal Controversy

and Problems of Implementation, 16 VIL. L. REv. 1029, 1042 (1971).
35 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.P.I. 1970).
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overcome a lack of knowledge and, at the same time, to oversee the entire
judicial process including the time after a man is convicted. In Inmates
36
of Cook County Jail v. Tierney, after rulings on some preliminary
motions indicated the plaintiffs might succeed, the suit was dismissed when
settlement was reached on some reforms. Not only were prison officials
also approved a nine million dollar
prodded to action, but the voters
37
bond issue for new jail facilities!
Still another problem is the conflict such intervention creates in our
federalist system. The remedial opinion of the principal case alludes to
this when it speaks of the delicacy of coming into conflict with the state
court, which is by statute in Ohio the rule-making authority for the
prisons. A related issue is the fragmentation of authority which occurs in
Ohio, involving the state courts, which make rules; the sheriff, who
manages the jail; and the county commissioners, who provide the
funds. Upon whom does the responsibility devolve?38
As far as funds are involved, the court did what little it could by
authorizing the transfer of money among funds and whatever accounting
3
procedures become necessary. But, as was pointed out in Holt, one
cannot make bricks without straw.
This discussion points out that the real problem is a need for
a basic change in attitude on the part of the public itself before any
real reforms can be effected.
Finally, it has been suggested that this intervention might encourage
prisoner suits, overloading the dockets and harassing innocent penal
seem to be a better
employees. But the dismissal of frivolous claims 4would
0
remedy when constitutional rights are involved.
Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of the principal opinion will
prove to be that dealing with prisoners, detained awaiting trial, in
conditions which even otherwise constitute cruel and unusual punishment
is violative of due process. Since the law as to convicts is41more developed
at this time, this note does not address itself to that point.
It seems clear that some kind of uniform code of prisoners' rights
42
might go a long way toward solving a great many of these problems.

36 No. 68C504 (N.D. Ill. 1968)

(settled) (J. Hoffman, J.).

37 An Annotated Bibliography on Prison Reform,
38 McGee, Our Sick Jails, 35 FED. PROB. 3 (1971).

1 BLACK L.J. 189 (1971).

39 309 F. Supp. at 382.

40 Note, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An Emerging Vehicle of Post-Conviction Relief for State
Prisoners, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 596 (1970).
41 See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 960
(1965).
42 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 259 (1970).
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Jones v. Wittenberg carries federal court intervention into state prison
administration to new lengths. Until more basic and lasting changes are
made on the part of society and the states, such intervention seems to be
the best chance for ameliorating conditions in our state penal systems.
Chief Justice Burger has said, "[i]f any phase of the administration
of justice is more neglected than the operation of the courts, it is the
correctional systems." 43 The courts seem to be abandoning that neglect.
RONALD L. COLLINS

43 Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary,57 A.B.A.J. 855 (1971).
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